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Reconciling the First Amendment with
the Individual's Reputation: The




Many lawyers, scholars, and judges have suggested either that
the present federal constitutional limits on libel law do not ade-
quately protect freedoms of speech and of the press, or that they do
not permit individuals who have been defamed to obtain sufficient
recompense.' The authors of the recently published Iowa University
libel study, which examined 909 libel and privacy actions from 1974
to 1984, conclude that "the essence of today's libel law is directed,
not at truth, nor to protection of reputation, but instead toward en-
forcement of press responsibility."2 What features of the constitu-
tional law of defamation have caused the libel suit to become so mis-
directed? And how can the law achieve a better balance between
concerns for reputation and speech? Plainly, the use of standards
based on the fault of the defendant, the manner in which these stan-
dards have been defined, and the incorporation of separate standards
* Associate in the firm of Ropes & Gray, Boston, Massachusetts. Harvard College
(A.B., 1985); Harvard Law School (J.D., 1988).
1. See Kaufman, Libel 1980-85: Promises and Realities, 90 DICK. L. REV. 545, 546
(1986) ("[T]he now more than twenty-year-old promise of constitutional protection from the
undue chilling effects of libel claims remains decidedly unfulfilled."); M. FRANKLIN, MASS
MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 291 (3d ed. 1987) (Defendants stress the "high costs of
successful defense," and argue that "they are being diverted from the investigative reporting
that should be going on by the preparation for litigation."); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (Unless the plaintiff can
prove a case of knowing and reckless falsehood, "the New York Times rule plainly leaves the
public official without a remedy for the damage to his reputation."); B. FEIN, NEW YORK
TIMES V. SULLIVAN: AN OBSTACLE TO ENLIGHTENED PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND GOVERNMENT
RESPONSIVENESS TO THE PEOPLE 1, 2 (1984) (The "actual malice standard deters skilled peo-
ple from entering government service; the law should apply a negligence standard to all plain-
tiffs."); Smolla, Taking Libel Reform Seriously, 38 MERCER L. REV. 793, 793 (1987) ("Case
by case, common law and constitutional law development has simply failed to produce a coher-
ent, equitable system for redressing injury to reputation that nonetheless maintains sufficient
breathing space for freedom of speech.") (footnote omitted).
2. R. BEZANSON, G. CRANBERG & J. SOLOSKI, LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND
REALITY 170 (1987) [hereinafter BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI].
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for different kinds of plaintiffs have led to dissatisfaction on the part
of plaintiffs, apprehension and caution on the part of the press, and
confusion for the courts that administer the laws. Focusing attention
on the accuracy of disputed statements would allow a plaintiff to
address the substance of what was said, protect the independence of
the press, and simplify the administration of libel suits.
Libel plaintiffs are frustrated because existing constitutional
standards do not allow them to obtain regularly a definitive ruling on
the truth or falsity of contested statements. The Iowa libel study
concluded that most plaintiffs are chiefly concerned with the "actual
falsity" of such statements at the time they are published.' Yet the
constitutional fault privileges of negligence and actual malice direct
courts' attention to the publisher's knowledge and whether he had
doubts about the veracity of his information. Plaintiffs have difficulty
demonstrating a factual basis sufficient to meet these standards when
defendants move for dismissal or summary judgment. One author
notes that more than seventy-five percent of libel cases result in sum-
mary judgment for the defendant and that in such cases the court
does not decide the issue of truth or falsity." The Iowa study found
that when both pretrial and appellate decisions are considered, "87
percent of all media libel cases are resolved on privilege grounds."5
Plaintiffs who are thus denied an opportunity to "set the record
straight" gradually come to view litigation as a way to "get even"
with the publisher who they believe has injured them.' If plaintiff's
initial objective is to correct or clarify the publisher's statements,
then a legal procedure that makes central the issue of the state-
ments' accuracy will more readily allow plaintiffs to accomplish their
desired goal.
Proponents of the media point out that the application of consti-
tutional fault standards in libel law has enabled plaintiffs to inflict
substantial costs upon the press, to disrupt the normal publishing op-
erations through litigation and the threat of litigation, and to create
an environment in which the press must evaluate the legal conse-
quences of proceeding with any story before publishing it.7 Because
3. Id. at 174-75.
4. M. FRANKLIN, supra note 1, at 291.
5. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 185 (footnote omitted).
6. "The act of suing, by itself, represents a real form of personal vindication, serves to
legitimate the claim of falsity, exacts a penalty on the media for conduct perceived to be unfair
to the plaintiff, and provides an outlet-the only outlet-for the plaintiff's frustrations." Id. at
181.
7. See, e.g., Thompson, Libel in the Media: A Reporter's Perspective, 38 MERCER L.J.
779, 782-83 (1987) (The effects of libel law include rising costs of libel insurance, the disap-
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defendants win the majority of libel suits at the pretrial stage, the
primary source of expense is the payment of litigation costs, espe-
cially attorneys' fees. Libel defense costs are frequently measured in
the millions of dollars.8 Moreover, when defendants do not win on
summary judgment, they lose jury verdicts at rates of twenty-five to
thirty-five percent greater than those for most tort suits.9 Million
dollar verdicts, which in 1984 and 1985 were awarded in one-third of
libel cases, are usually reversed by appellate courts, but the need to
continue litigating after trial produces further costs.' 0
Defendants' expenses are large in part because plaintiffs can
bring suits without themselves investing substantial resources. Since
over eighty percent of libel plaintiffs engage their lawyers on a con-
tingency fee basis, "for many libel plaintiffs the decision to sue is
essentially cost free, and therefore risk free in financial terms."" In
addition, the unlikelihood of a court actually deciding the underlying
question of truth or falsity means that plaintiffs can bring several
appeals without having to worry about the danger of adverse public-
ity from losing on the substance of their claims.' 2
Some legal thinkers suggest that the press ought to consider the
expense of defending libel suits as a cost of doing business. The diffi-
culty with this view is that if costs are too great, some organs of the
media may be forced to curtail or end their business, and such a
result reduces the value of the Constitution's protection of freedom
of speech. Although an action that concentrates on the veracity of
statements might still be the subject of great dispute, it would permit
parties to address the issues of reputation and defamation sooner
than they could under present law and at substantially lower cost to
defendants.
By focusing on the conduct of the defendant, constitutional lim-
its on libel law also enable plaintiffs to interrupt publishers' opera-
tions with extensive requests for discovery.' Thus, while the media
pearance of interoffice newsroom memoranda, and the employment of newsroom attorneys who
advise reporters on the risk of publishing.).
8. See R. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 75-76 (1986). The legal bill for CBS in the West-
moreland case was between $5 million and $10 million; in a suit by Mobil Oil President Wil-
liam Tavoulareas against the Washington Post, the newspaper's legal expenses were approxi-
mately $1.8 million.
9. See id. at 73.
10. Id. at 73-74.
II. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 149.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 209 ("It is ... because of the need to find fault that the editorial process
must be disgorged, that the steps leading to publication must be explored, and that the actual
frame of mind of the principal parties to the publication must be ascertained.").
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may succeed in obtaining the reversal on appeal of two-thirds of the
jury judgments awarded to plaintiffs,
The appellate victory comes after years . . . of litigation, in
which legal fees, and time lost by reporters and editors confer-
ring with lawyers, filling out documents, and testifying at depo-
sitions and trials is as much punishment as the plaintiff's award
would have been had the plaintiff simply been paid off the day
after the story was run. "
If the press perceives litigation costs and discovery as a real threat to
its financial or editorial independence, then it is likely to respond by
limiting the scope of topics it covers or the aggressiveness with which
it investigates those subjects. This "chilling effect" may function in
part beneficially to curb "irresponsible" conduct, but shifting the
law's emphasis to the truth or falsity of the statements would allow
the individual plaintiff to expose baseless statements and to restore
his reputation without threatening the publisher's ability to decide in
the future what he will say.
Besides making recovery difficult for plaintiffs and producing
the "chilling effect" experienced by the media, the fault standards in
defamation law complicate the analysis that courts must perform to
administer the law. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'5 the Su-
preme Court established
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recover-
ing damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'ac-
tual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 6
In subsequent cases, the Court extended the "actual malice" stan-
dard to "public figures. 1 7 Then in 1974, the Court cited public offi-
cials' and public figures' greater access to the channels of communi-
cation and their conscious decision to risk closer public scrutiny as
reasons for treating public and private defamation plaintiffs
differently. 8
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 9 the court wrote, "[S]o long as
they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
14. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, at 77.
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. Id. at 279-80.
17. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
18. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
19. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individ-
ual."20 The Gertz ruling in effect requires private plaintiffs to prove
negligence before they can recover damages. More recently, in Dun
& Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,21 the Supreme Court
adopted an additional distinction, which it had rejected in Gertz, be-
tween issues of public concern and issues of private concern. The
Court, however, reaffirmed the application of different fault stan-
dards to public and private plaintiffs.
Application of separate standards of fault to different types of
plaintiffs demands that courts spend a great amount of time deciding
which standards of conduct will govern, whether a statement con-
tains an apparent defamatory meaning, and what sum of damages
should be awarded. The authors of the Iowa libel study observe that
"the principal issue in 88 percent of the cases is privilege-related,
and more often than not the questions pertinent to constitutional
privilege determinations are distinct from those applicable to the un-
derlying defamation claim."22 They argue that the emphasis in libel
litigation on the question of the proper fault standard is so pervasive
that "the investment of judicial resources in libel cases is vastly dis-
proportionate to the purposes served by the tort of defamation as
presently constituted. 23 Other scholars agree and conclude, "[T]he
Court's own repeated tinkering with variable scienter standards, as
one means of working out a fair adjustment between damaged plain-
tiffs and apprehensive publishers, is now too complicated and virtu-
ally exhausted." '24
A related problem involves the question of whether the pub-
lisher must be aware of the defamatory meaning of his statement
before he is liable. The Supreme Court in Gertz concluded that the
negligence standard equitably balances the interests of the private
individual and the publisher "where . . .the substance of the defam-
atory statement 'makes substantial danger to reputation appar-
ent.' "23 At least one commentator suggests that the incremental in-
crease in self-censorship that results from holding the defendant
liable when actual malice with respect to falsity is shown, but when
20. Id. at 347 (footnote omitted).
21. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
22. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 126.
23. Id. at 133.
24. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on Recovery From the Press-An Ex-
tended Comment on "The Anderson Solution", 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 796 (1984).
25. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 155).
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the defendant had no knowledge of defamatory content, usefully dis-
courages false statements. 0
Finally, courts need to determine whether a plaintiff is a public
or private figure to decide not only the threshold of liability but also
to apply the appropriate rules for awarding damages. Gertz limited
the power of the states to presume harm and to provide damages in
defamation cases without finding evidence of actual loss. 27 The
Court's decision upheld the application in public figure cases of state
law rules that do not require a plaintiff to show how the falsity of a
statement has injured his reputation. With regard to what consti-
tutes "actual injury," the Gertz opinion noted that "the more cus-
tomary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood in-
clude impairment of reputation and standing in the community,
personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering."
2a
By adopting such a broad concept of "actual injury," the Su-
preme Court left to lower courts the difficult problem of determining
the existence of any injury to reputation. Moreover, in Dun & Brad-
street the Court removed the requirement of proof of actual injury
from cases involving issues of purely "private concern." Thus, only
private figures who bring suit with respect to a matter of public con-
cern are now required to prove actual injury.2 9 In awarding dam-
ages, therefore, courts must decide both the plaintiffs status and
whether the subject is of public or private concern before they can
determine whether they should apply the common law presumption
of injury or the broad constitutional standard of actual injury. More
generally, the standards of fault that govern the constitutional law of
libel insufficiently protect reputation, discourage speech, and compli-
cate judicial administration.
A legislatively enacted declaratory judgment action is a remedy
that, if formulated with care, would satisfy plaintiffs' desire to obtain
an adjudication on the truth or falsity of disputed statements, the
media's need to be able to defend against suit without having to in-
cur huge litigation expenses, and the systemic aim of simplifying the
adjudication of libel suits. What specific features of an action for a
declaratory judgment would best accomplish these goals? Two pro-
26. See, e.g., Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 891, 895
(1984).
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349. The Court wrote that a state's interest in compensating
private individuals "extends no further than compensation for actual injury .... [T] he States
may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based
on a showing of knowledge or falsity or reckless disregard for the truth." Id.
28. Id. at 350.
29. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
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posals for a declaratory judgment provide a basis for study. Professor
Marc A. Franklin has developed one version, which he calls the
Plaintiff's Option Libel Reform Act ("POLRA"). POLRA would
give all plaintiffs the ability to decide whether to pursue a judicial
declaration of truth or falsity or a suit for damages.30
The second proposal, which was drafted in part by Professor
David A. Barrett and which has been presented in the form of a bill
to the House of Representatives by Congressman Charles Schumer,
would authorize only public figure plaintiffs to bring a declaratory
judgment action. In addition, the Schumer bill would enable media
defendants to forcibly convert any defamation suit by public plain-
tiffs into an action for a declaratory judgment. 31
The following analysis of these proposals includes consideration
of important Supreme Court libel cases and criticism of the idea of a
nonmonetary remedy. It will indicate how a declaratory judgment
should be constructed to fairly balance concerns for increasing the
protection given to reputation and decreasing the present magnitude
of the chilling effect. First, the article discusses the general advan-
tages of creating a nonmonetary remedy that provides declarative
relief on the basis of a statement's falsity. Then, it examines particu-
lar elements of a claim for a declaratory judgment. Next, the appli-
cation of a declaratory judgment to different types of plaintiffs are
considered and whether it should be created by federal or state legis-
lation. In addition, the article address the questions of whether a
declaratory judgment should be an exclusive remedy and how modi-
fying damage suits would make a declaratory judgment more effec-
tive. Finally, the need for provisions governing an award of attor-
neys' fees to the prevailing party are evaluated.
II. The Advantages of Creating a Declaratory Judgment
A declaratory judgment procedure would address the issue cen-
tral to plaintiffs of the falsity of the defendant's statement, accom-
plish important goals of tort law, and decrease the likelihood of me-
dia self-censorship. The Iowa libel study concluded that "most
plaintiffs are chiefly concerned with the underlying falsity of the
challenged statement, and seek a prompt and fair process for pub-
licly setting the record straight." 32 Specifically, seventy-six percent
30. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L.
REV. 809 (1986).
31. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
847 (1986).
32. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 160.
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of plaintiffs express interest in alternatives to existing libel suits
without preconditioning their interest on the availability of money
damages. 38 When plaintiffs declare their goals after bringing suit,
their comments might be dismissed as self-serving, but the study's
authors stress that plaintiffs' concern with reputation is predominant
only at the time of publication.3 4 Although plaintiffs are more inter-
ested in taking revenge against the defendant at the time they com-
mence suit, their readiness to accept a remedy that restores their
reputation without providing damages suggests that they would be
willing to hire counsel to represent them in pursuing such a remedy
on an hourly fee basis, if the remedy awarded the prevailing party
reasonable attorneys' fees. Lawyers' willingness to accept libel suits
not brought to obtain damages will influence which libel claims are
litigated, (an issue discussed in detail later) but the main point is
that plaintiffs are primarily interested in addressing the substance of
what was published.
Plaintiffs' concern with falsity is also consistent with the funda-
mental elements of an action for defamation. A defamatory commu-
nication is defined as one that "tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."' 5 The first
requirement in a defamation suit is the existence of "a false and
defamatory statement concerning another."36 A publisher is not lia-
ble for defamation for making a true statement.3 7 The federal consti-
tutional law of libel, however, has made the defendant's fault (not
the statement's falsity) the principal issue in most defamation
cases.38 In libel cases involving media defendants, only thirteen per-
cent of all suits have truth or falsity as their primary focus.3 9 Most
of the remaining cases never include an evidentiary trial on defama-
tion counts.40 A 1986 case, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps," which held that a private figure plaintiff has the burden of
showing that the speech at issue is actually false, is unlikely to
33. Id.
34. Id. at 175.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
36. Id. at § 558(a).
37. Id. at § 581A.
38. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 106 ("For defamation cases
between 1974 and 1984, constitutional privilege [questions of state of mind and fault] repre-
sented the main legal issue adjudicated in 84 percent of the cases.").
39. Id.
40. Id. at 107.
41. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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change the law's emphasis on fault.42 Falsity becomes important only
when suits reach trial. s Because present doctrine emphasizes the de-
fendant's responsibility, rather than the issue of whether what was
published is false and defamatory, plaintiffs can effectuate their ini-
tial desire to restore their reputation only if they can first make the
more difficult showing that the defendant was at fault.
In contrast, by definition a declaratory judgment is a remedy
that would directly provide the plaintiff with a judicial finding on the
truth or falsity of disputed statements. The plaintiff is assured a
favorable judgment if the published materials are false, independent
of whether the defendant acted conscientiously, negligently, or reck-
lessly in making the statements. The act of bringing suit may, by
drawing attention to the plaintiff's sense of outrage, help to restore
an individual's reputation." A judgment of falsity also has value for
the defamed plaintiff even though it does not bring an award of
monetary damages. The plaintiff obtains a formal declaration that
derives important weight and respect from the neutral, institutional
role of the courts in society. Such a judgment, when it is presented
to friends and colleagues or marketed to employers or even to the
public by the defendant's competitors, restores a plaintiff's reputa-
tion with the same force and effect that a retraction does, but with-
out the danger of the government's coercing speech that is associated
with forced publication.4 Although a plaintiff may suffer harm from
defamatory remarks between the time of publication and the time a
judgment issues, the plaintiff will assess this risk before deciding
whether or not to elect a declaratory judgment. The principal virtue
of the declaratory judgment for plaintiffs is that it would correct fal-
sity with truth, and that it would do so with greater speed than a
traditional suit for damages.
A second attractive feature of a declaratory judgment is that it
would fulfill two established tort law goals of deterring conduct that
has fallen below a socially acceptable level and compensating indi-
viduals for injuries that they have incurred. At present, the threat of
damages and, more importantly, the costs of litigation deter publish-
ers from making false and defamatory remarks. Most libel plaintiffs
42. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 184 ("While it is hoped
that Hepps will result in greater emphasis on actual truth or falsity in libel cases, the failure to
address truth or falsity in litigation seems largely to be a function of the fault privileges, not
the burden of proof on the truth question.").
43. Only 20 percent of all media libel cases reach trial. Id. at 107.
44. Franklin, supra note 30, at 828.
45. Id. See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258-59 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
93 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1989
believe that bringing suit will enable them to "get even" with those
who have defamed them and thus deter the defendant from publish-
ing libelous remarks in the future. 6 Yet the willingness of seventy
percent of plaintiffs to consider a nonlitigation alternative that in-
cludes a finding on truth or falsity4" suggests that many individuals
who are unable to prove that a defendant is at fault, and who cannot
now reach a judicial hearing on truth or falsity, are not satisfied that
a suit for damages sufficiently deters publishers from printing
libelous statements.
The court's use in Sharon v. Time, Inc. 8 of a special verdict
procedure, which allowed the jury to find that Time magazine's arti-
cle on an Israeli minister's role in the massacre of Palestinian refu-
gees contained falsehoods but that Time acted without reckless dis-
regard of the truth, was "unprecedented" 49 at the time and has since
been used infrequently in defamation cases. Because plaintiffs are
often denied the chance to resolve the dispute concerning falsity,
they commonly complain that libel law should be altered to assure
the public of the media's responsibility. 0
Adverse declaratory judgments would effectively deter the pub-
lication of false and defamatory statements if prevailing plaintiffs
were successful at using the judgments to publicly criticize the is-
suer's general character for truthfulness. Plaintiffs might accomplish
such criticism by informing a broad range of media organizations
that compete with the defendant about the news of the judgment or
by drawing the attention of national news councils or journalism re-
views to the defendant's questionable credibility. Critics of the de-
claratory judgment argue that irresponsible defendants could default
and thereby prevent a court from arriving at an authoritative deter-
mination of truth or falsity. Professor Franklin suggests, by way of
response, that a careful plaintiff would consider the likelihood of a
defendant's default before choosing to pursue a declaratory judg-
ment 5' and perhaps "seek a guarantee from the defendant that it
will not default if the plaintiff chooses the declaratory judgment
46. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 162-65, 175; see, e.g., Wise,
Time Not Guilty of Malice in Report on Sharon, 193 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1985) (Ariel Sharon stated,
"We hope it [the verdict] will prevent Time magazine from libeling in the future.").
47. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 159.
48. 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
49. Norris, Winning the War Against Self-Censorship: Eliminating Special Verdicts in
Defamation Actions, 90 DICK. L. REV. 683, 704 (1986).
50. See, e.g., Westmoreland, A Case For Press Responsibility, 38 MERCER L. REV. 771,
777 (1987).
51. Franklin, supra note 30, at 820 n.45.
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path." 52
If the plaintiff has little chance of winning a damage suit, how-
ever, then he has almost no bargaining power. Nevertheless, the pub-
lic and competing news media may perceive the default itself as an
admission of error, and plaintiffs could use default as a vehicle for
criticizing the defendant's reliability." Publishers who claim that
they report "all the news that's fit to print" are unlikely to default
because a default suggests that the publisher is uncertain about the
truth of his statements or that he acted irresponsibly in publishing
them. Reputable publishers usually acknowledge mistakes by issuing
retractions or printing corrections, methods that allow them to con-
fess error without losing credibility. The scandal press probably at-
tracts most of its readers with the possibility that some of what it
reports is true. Thus, if such publishers default regularly, they be-
come less trustworthy, and through competition with others, may
lose circulation."
Finally, when the plaintiff is the subject of false statements is-
sued by publishers whose supporters maintain an unswerving politi-
cal or religious devotion, then perhaps a suit for monetary damages
will be a swift deterrent. But the risk of acquiring a reputation for
lying or excessive exaggeration may in the long run be a more effec-
tive deterrent than large legal fees or damage awards. In general,
because the declaratory judgment's outcome affects the reputation of
the defendant for accuracy in publishing and because most publish-
ers would lose credibility and money if their stories were pronounced
false by a court, the declaratory judgment would help deter the pub-
lication of false statements.
Although a declaratory judgment would not provide monetary
compensation to defamed plaintiffs, it would compensate such plain-
tiffs by rectifying their community standing or dignity. The Supreme
Court's decision in Gertz stating that defamed plaintiffs, who could
not show actual malice, could recover only "compensation for actual
injury" 58 suggests that reputation is important partly as a property
52. Id.
53. But see id. at 839 & n. 119.
54. See Mild-Mannered Buyers Tame Wild Tabloids, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1988, at Al,
col. 4. The executive publisher of several popular papers explains that his stories are now
tamer because his readers will not buy material that is too horrific or shocking. Mentioning the
Carol Burnett victory against the National Enquirer, however, the article also suggests that
erroneous reporting will "backfire" and limit such papers' credibility.
55. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). See also Post, The Social
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691,
693-99 (1986) (reputation as "property").
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interest. But the Court's definition of actual injury, by including
such harms as "impairment of reputation and standing in the com-
munity, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering," '56
indicates that the concept of reputation also includes the notion of
dignity, defined by one commentator as "the respect . . . that arises
from full membership in society."57
The Supreme Court has reiterated that "the individual's right to
the protection of his own good name 'reflects no more than our basic
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.' -8
Moreover, the identification by the majority of plaintiffs of the need
for a finding on truth or falsity as the central issue in libel law, and
the readiness of such plaintiffs to accept a remedy that includes this
finding, 59 indicates that they view the injury to their dignity as the
principal damage caused by defamatory statements. The declaratory
judgment, by providing a judicial finding on truth or falsity, compen-
sates plaintiffs by rehabilitating their individual dignity and restor-
ing their communal identity.
By returning to the plaintiff his good name instead of money
damages that are at best an approximation of the social worth of
that name, the declaratory judgment also affirms that each individ-
ual's dignity is of equal value. Professor Robert Post argues persua-
sively that reputation as an interest in dignity differs from reputation
as an interest in "honor.""0 The distinction is crucial because the
Supreme Court in New York Times, by rejecting the "honorific sta-
tus of public officials," indicated that "the premises by which a def-
erence society is governed are incompatible with the democracy cre-
ated by the United States Constitution."'" More generally, a suit for
damages, in which the size of the verdict depends in part on the
notoriety and identity of the parties, may "be conceived [of] as em-
powering juries to pursue the 'noncompensatory' end of vindicating
the plaintiffs honor . ... -"a By contrast, because a declaratory
56. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
57. Post, supra note 55, at 711.
58. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-58 (1985)
(quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (concurring opinion)).
59. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 150, 159.
60. See Post, supra note 55, at 715 ("Honor is concerned with attributes of personal
identity that stem from the characteristics of particular social roles, whereas dignity is con-
cerned with the aspects of personal identity that stem from membership in the general
community.").
61. Id. at 724 (footnote omitted).
62. Id. at 706 (quoting Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 747, 750 (1984)) (footnote omitted).
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judgment provides the same remedy to all, it recognizes that each
plaintiff's claim that his dignity has been injured merits equal
consideration.
The most important advantage of creating a declaratory judg-
ment action is that its very simplicity of operation would reduce the
present magnitude of the chilling effect on publishers. Students of
the constitutional features of libel law have noted that the require-
ment that the plaintiff show the defendant's fault, especially in cases
involving public figures, is largely responsible for the substantial
costs incurred by publishers.63 The constitutional fault standards
have made defending a libel suit costly mainly because the issues
being litigated concern the overall mechanism of the editorial pro-
cess rather than the more limited elements of reputation, harm, and
falsity.64 In cases involving public figures, plaintiffs must meet the
demanding standard of "actual malice"; they must present "suffi-
cient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." 5 In
suits brought by private figures, a plaintiff has to demonstrate at a
minimum that the defendant acted in a "wrongful" or negligent
manner."' Because the plaintiff must establish either that the defend-
ant in his own mind doubted the accuracy of what he published or
that, viewed objectively, the defendant's conduct was negligent,
"[L]awyers [for both sides] spend a considerable amount of time
probing the inner decisionmaking process of the publisher or broad-
caster being sued, a process that makes for very expensive legal fees
... ," The complexity involved in objecting to and complying
with extensive requests for information about editorial decisionmak-
ing explains why attorneys' fees comprise eighty percent of the ex-
pense of defending libel suits.68 This legal expense contributes sub-
stantially to the tremendous costs incurred by publishers and to the
consequent incentive to avoid those costs by excluding controversial
stories.
Defense costs in libel suits against large, nationally-known me-
63. See, e.g., BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 208-09 (The constitu-
tional fault standards "have generated an additional type of proceduralization that has added
great complexity and expense to public defamation litigation." This proceduralization "has
shifted costs to the defendants, not to the plaintiffs, and the procedural obstacles have deterred
publishers more than plaintiffs.").
64. See id. at 208.
65. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
66. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
67. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, at 66.
68. Goodale, Survey of Recent Media Verdicts, Their Disposition on Appeal, and Me-
dia Defense Costs, in MEDIA INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 87 (1985).
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dia organizations have reached staggering heights. Expenses are also
significant even for smaller, more localized defendants. The cost to
CBS television of defending the libel suit brought by General Wil-
liam Westmoreland is estimated to have been between $6.5 million
and $10 million.69 Time magazine's legal expenses in the Sharon
case were probably $1.5 million. 0 In a 1981 research survey, Profes-
sor Franklin found that the legal fees of one newspaper, which had a
daily circulation of between 100,000 and 300,000 from 1976-80, in-
creased to approximately $75,000 during the last year of that pe-
riod.7 Recent estimates, which do not include the costs of appeal,
place the cost of defending a libel suit at $200,000.72 Moreover, the
rise in litigation expenses has led to substantial increases in the cost
of libel insurance. For example, the newspaper examined by Frank-
lin paid $3,000 per year for $5,000,000 worth of coverage during the
relevant five-year period but had its per-case deductible increase
from $10,000 in 1976 to $20,000 in 1980.11 Another group of news-
papers has had to contend with not only an increased deductible but
also with a rise in premiums from $7,700 in 1983-84 to $31,872 in
1985-86."' Notably, attorneys' fees in defamation cases and libel in-
surance premiums are likely to continue to increase.75 Failure of the
Times and Gertz precedents to reduce defense costs is, therefore, the
most important reason for the continuing pressure to censor.76
Although it may appear that some organs of the media such as
supermarket tabloids can print whatever they like without restraint,
the substantial costs of litigation have forced publishers to curtail the
aggressiveness with which they report controversial stories. A promi-
nent example involves a suit against a daily paper in Illinois with a
circulation of 38,000 called the Alton Telegraph.77 The paper had an
annual profit margin of about $200,000, but it lost a $1.5 million
libel judgment78 in a suit concerning a memorandum written by two
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Franklin, Suing Media For Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
797, 800 n.13.
72. See Goodale, supra note 68, at 87; L. FORER, A. CHILLING EFFECT 164 (1987).
73. Franklin, supra note 71, at 800 n.13.
74. Goodale, supra note 68, at 88.
75. Id.
76. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 436 (1975).
77. Green v. Alton Telegraph Co., No. 77-66 (Madison County Ill. 1980), appeal dis-
missed, 107 III. App. 3d 755, 438 N.E.2d 203 (1982). See also R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, at
74.
78. GANNETT CENTER FOR MEDIA STUDIES, THE COST OF LIBEL 5 (1986) [hereinafter
THE COST OF LIBEL].
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of its reporters that was sent to a federal investigator.7 9 In addition,
the paper incurred $612,795 in defense costs."0 The Telegraph "was
forced to file for bankruptcy to avoid having to sell all its assets."'"
Thomas Littlewood of the University of Illinois Journalism Depart-
ment observes that since the lawsuit,
the Telegraph is a pussycat. Whenever the editor is asked
about why don't we do this or that investigative project he says,
"Let someone else stick out his neck this time." The business of
the newsroom is being conducted orally. The reporters and edi-
tors don't write memos to one another anymore. The reporters
are instructed to destroy their notes one day after a story is pub-
lished. And the owners have done what they swore they would
never do: They've sold the paper.82
The cost of defending a defamation suit has forced publishers
not only to destroy reporters' notes but also to submit stories to libel
lawyers before publication. If the role of these attorneys was limited
to advising on the possibility of a libel suit, and publishers utilized
that advice as a method of double-checking a story's accuracy, the
lawyers would serve a beneficial function. But if the lawyer's deci-
sion about the likelihood of a plaintiff's bringing suit determines
whether a story is published, then the issue of what news is impor-
tant is subordinated to matters of who the potential plaintiff is, how
sensitive he is, and how much power he wields. As one commentator
points out, publishers' lawyers are often those who handle their tax
work, collections, contracts, labor relations, and other corporate legal
work. Thus, "[o]ne may doubt whether the nature of these lawyers'
practice will give them either the time or the inclination to contem-
plate seriously the subtle constitutional and societal interests at stake
in libel litigation."83 Because of huge defense costs and large insur-
ance premiums, small newspapers and magazines in particular are
inclined to avoid printing anything that could possibly lead to a libel
suit.8
Constitutional privileges impose costs on publishers not only be-
cause of the complex initial determination of fault, but also because
defendants must often appeal in order to benefit from their applica-
tion. Plaintiffs who reach trial receive favorable verdicts in a large
79. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, at 74.
80. THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 78, at 5.
81. R. SMOLLA, supra note 8, at 74.
82. THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 78, at 5.
83. Anderson, supra note 76, at 439 (footnote omitted).
84. THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 78, at 5.
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majority of cases and, with increasing frequency, juries are giving
such plaintiffs huge damage awards. One study ("the 1982 LDRC
study") of fifty-four cases decided between 1980 and 1982 made by
the Libel Defense Resource Center (LDRC) found that plaintiffs
won eighty-seven percent of the trial verdicts."5 A second LDRC
study ("The 1984 LDRC study") of sixty-three cases decided be-
tween 1982 and 1984 showed that plaintiffs won fifty-four percent of
the verdicts. 6 The most recent LDRC study examined sixty-one
cases in 1985 and 1986. It found that news organizations lost sev-
enty-two percent of the cases at trial.87 In addition, the Iowa libel
study, which examined 909 cases from 1974 to 1984, found that for
all libel cases, plaintiffs won at trial sixty-one percent of the time; of
media libel cases that were tried, eighty-five percent resulted in a
verdict for the plaintiff.88
Calling such high rates "unacceptable," former vice-chairman
of The New York Times James C. Goodale notes that by compari-
son, plaintiffs prevail in only thirty to forty percent of medical mal-
practice and product liability cases."8 The authors of the Iowa libel
study contend that because the fault standards usually eliminate fac-
tually weak claims, "[tihe strength of the plaintiffs' claims, not the
vagaries of jury prejudice, seems to account for plaintiff success."90
Whether or not jury prejudice affects the number of plaintiffs' ver-
dicts, jury bias in favor of plaintiffs certainly has influenced the size
of damages awarded. In the 1982 LDRC study, the average initial
damage award was $2,051,178.20 and the average punitive damage
award was $2,520,901.60.91 The figures in the 1984 LDRC study
were $2,033,367.00 and $2,980,093.70, respectively."2 In two cases,
juries awarded punitive damages of $26.5 million and $37 million.93
In explaining why the average awards in libel suits are three
times larger than those found in other tort cases,94 some authors
point to the public's perception that the press is unfair95 or empha-
85. LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 11 LDRC BULL. (Oct. 9, 1984) [hereinafter
1984 LDRC BULL.].
86. Id.
87. N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1988, at Bl1, col. 4.
88. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKi, supra note 2, at 142-43.
89. Goodale, supra note 68, at 73.
90. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 143.
91. 1984 LDRC BULL., supra note 85, at 14-15.
92. Id.
93. Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1984, at D2, col. 2.
94. Goodale, supra note 68, at 78.
95. See, e.g., E. PELL, THE BIG CHILL 164 (1984).
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size the need to teach the press to be responsible.9 Another com-
mentator suggests that certain aspects of libel doctrine, such as the
broad definition of "actual injury" or the use of presumed and puni-
tive damages, have "invited juries to spend in accordance with their
sympathies." 9 Significantly, however, after appeal the average
award drops to a small fraction of its original size, and, according to
one 1985 study, no million dollar award has yet been upheld."8 The
Iowa study found that sixty-three percent of media libel cases won
by plaintiffs at trial were reversed on appeal, largely on privilege
grounds. 99 Plainly, defendants' success at the appellate level indi-
cates that lower courts and juries are misapplying the fault stan-
dards. Thus, while huge initial damage awards might not directly
burden the press, the need to appeal lower court decisions regularly
in order to prevail ultimately or to reduce the damages is a source of
expense that contributes to the chilling effect.
A declaratory judgment remedy that considers the publisher's
thoughts or beliefs irrelevant and exempts them from disclosure
would reduce the present chilling effect. One commentator protests
that "[a] suit for nominal damages or declaratory judgment would
involve the full panoply of defamation issues, except those relating to
damages, and the substantial costs of defending would be the
same." 100 This argument is directed against the use of special ver-
dicts in damage actions, a procedure that allows a plaintiff to ac-
quire a finding of falsity without offering the defendant any protec-
tion against the detailed exploration of his decisionmaking. By
contrast, in a declaratory judgment, "[e]xpenses probably would fall,
because declaratory judgment actions will not involve litigation over
fault, which is the focus of the present extensive discovery."
101
Therefore, narrowing the scope of the plaintiff's inquiry from fault to
falsity would not only limit the suit's intrusion into the editorial pro-
cess; it would also make the defense counsel's work easier and thus
reduce the defendant's litigation costs. Furthermore, by substituting
a finding of truth or falsity for an award of damages, the declaratory
judgment would make the need to appeal less compelling. In sum,
the declaratory judgment's focus on the criterion of accuracy would
96. See, e.g., B. FEIN, supra note 1, at 6.
97. B. DILL, THE JOURNALIST'S HANDBOOK ON LIBEL AND PRIVACY 27 (1986).
98. See Goodale, supra note 68, at 85 (the 1982 LDRC study found the average award
upheld to be $119,456, and the average punitive award to be $110,480; the corresponding 1984
LDRC study figures were $60,416 and $59,166, respectively).
99. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 143.
100. Norris, supra note 49, at 698 (footnote omitted).
101. Franklin, supra note 30, at 820 n.44.
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remove much of the pressure on the media to censor its reports.
III. Important Elements of an Action for a Declaratory Judgment
The attraction of a declaratory judgment to plaintiffs, its ability
to fulfill desired goals of deterrence and compensation, and its effec-
tiveness in reducing the chilling effect, all depend greatly on the par-
ticular procedures and requirements incorporated in such a remedy.
Scholars Franklin and Barrett have defined the elements of a cause
of action for a declaratory judgment by stating that the goal is a
judgment that the publication was false and defamatory, that ob-
taining a judgment does not require proof of the defendant's state of
mind, and that no damages shall be awarded in such an action."' 2
These scholars also agree that the declaratory judgment should in-
clude a one-year statute of limitations. 103 In addition, Franklin in-
cludes provisions that would maintain existing common law privi-
leges and encourage the plaintiff and the defendant to discuss the
subject of any suit and any possible settlement before seeking judi-
cial action.' This section examines the arguments asserted by
Franklin and Barrett; then it discusses the features that a declara-
tory judgment remedy should incorporate. The declaratory judg-
ment's chief contribution to libel law is that it may lessen the danger
of self-censorship by the media while simultaneously providing the
plaintiff with a speedy method of clearing his name. This section,
therefore, focuses on the importance of assigning to the plaintiff the
burdens of proving falsity and injury to reputation, and on changing
procedural rules to prohibit the use of discovery.
The burden of proving falsity must lie with the plaintiff in order
to reduce the existing chilling effect. Otherwise, individual plaintiffs
could simply allege that they are the victims of a defamatory state-
ment and leave the defendant to choose between paying the costs of
proving the truth of his writings or defaulting and accepting the con-
sequent loss of credibility. Forcing publishers to make such a choice
is unacceptable because society has a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate "should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open."' 1 5 The Supreme Court indicated in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan that the difficulty and expense of having to prove
truth were likely to cause publishers to avoid unlawful statements.0"
102. Id. at 812. 832-33. See also Barrett, supra note 31.
103. Franklin, supra note 30, at 812, 834.
104. Id. at 812, 814-15.
105. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
106. Id. at 279 ("[a] rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth
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Furthermore, recent decisions by the Supreme Court1 0 7 and by lower
courts,108 holding that plaintiffs have the burden of proving not only
fault but also falsity in damage actions, continue to stress the need
to encourage and not limit debate. Since a declaratory judgment ac-
tion would not provide defendants with the additional protection of a
fault standard, promoting freedom of expression requires that the
plaintiff assume the burden of proving the central and crucial fact at
issue-the falsity of the defendant's statements.
Evidentiary considerations also support placing the burden of
proof on the plaintiff, especially when considered together with the
policy of encouraging vigorous debate. As the party bringing suit,
the plaintiff ought to prove the strength of his allegations."' 9 In a
society that values the exchange of thought as a process which pro-
motes the gradual development of true ideas by having such ideas
openly confront erroneous thinking, the burden should be on the
party who wants to limit that process by having specific expressions
condemned as false. Moreover, in most cases the plaintiff is more
capable of proving that a particular fact is false.110
In the event that the disputed statements are not specific about
time or place,1 1 or when they concern a subject about which the
plaintiff has little or no information, a court might fairly require the
defendant to first introduce some basis for having made the state-
ments. The ultimate risk of nonpersuasion, however, must rest with
the plaintiff.11 Thus, Franklin and Barrett are right to require the
of all his factual assertions ...leads to a comparable 'self-censorship.' ").
107. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct.
1558, 1564 (1986).
108. See, e.g., Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371, 376 (6th
Cir.) cert. dismissed 454 U.S. 1130 (1981) (in a diversity action brought by a private plaintiff,
the court concluded as a matter of federal first amendment law that the burden must be placed
on the plaintiff to show falsity); Meiners v. Moriarity, 563 F.2d 343, 351 (7th Cir. 1977) (in a
suit brought by plaintiff for civil rights violations, federal agents, who counterclaimed for defa-
mation and who were public officials, had the burden of proving that plaintiff's statements
were false in some material particular).
109. See 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2486 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
110. See Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1236
(1976). The author writes,
A plaintiff is in the best position to know the facts about his own life and
activities that will establish falsity. A plaintiff's simple denial would perhaps be
sufficient in the abnormal situation of a defendant who publishes statements that
conclusively defame without providing some information that would indicate
truth. If the defendant includes information tending to indicate truth, however,
the plaintiff, who has access to the facts of his life, can be expected to discharge
the burden of overcoming the suspicious circumstances.
Id.
111. See Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintifl's Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Fal-
sity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 859 (1984).
112. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 635 n.22 (1978).
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plaintiff who elects a declaratory judgment to bear the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's publi-
cation or broadcast was false and defamatory.11
A declaratory judgment remedy should also require the plaintiff
to prove that he has incurred actual harm if the remedy is effectively
to reduce the chilling effect. Present constitutional doctrines use
standards of fault to balance the first amendment's protection of
speech against the "legitimate state interest underlying the law of
libel," thereby compensating individuals "for the harm inflicted on
them by defamatory falsehood."11 That balance has thus far re-
quired only private figure plaintiffs who sue on a matter of public
concern to prove actual injury. 115 One commentator supports the
presumption of harm in damage suits brought by plaintiffs in other
cases. He argues that proof of the defendant's fault should entitle
the plaintiff to recovery, even if "the manner in which the defend-
ant's wrong harmed the plaintiff happened to be something other
than provable injury to reputation." 1 6 In a declaratory judgment,
however, the fault privileges are absent, so that a balance, which
both protects injured plaintiffs and avoids discouraging speech, is
possible only by strictly limiting all plaintiffs to relief "for the harm
inflicted on them."
Both POLRA and the Schumer bill are deficient because they
fail to include in their cause of action a provision requiring the plain-
tiff to prove harm-substantial, perceptible harm to reputation that
is either nonmonetary or pecuniary but that does not include emo-
tional harm. "[R]equiring proof of actual injury in a declaratory ac-
tion is unwise," writes Barrett, because "proof of such injury would
inject new evidentiary issues into libel cases . . . .While these com-
plications may be warranted when large damage awards are at
stake, they would undermine the simplicity of the declaratory ac-
tion." 1 Similarly, Franklin stresses that the declaratory judgment
must function simply if it is to reduce the amount of libel litiga-
tion.118 Mandating proof of harm will expand the scope of a declara-
tory judgment action. Yet without a requirement that the alleged
113. See Franklin, supra note 30, at 812, 833; Barrett, supra note 31, at 851.
114. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341-44 (1974).
115. See id. at 348-49. The opinion implies not that the actual injury standard may
apply to public figures, too, but rather that public plaintiffs may recover presumed damages if
they show actual malice.
116. Lebel, Defamation and the First Amendment: The End of the Affair, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 779, 784 (1986).
117. Barrett, supra note 31, at 851 n.26 (citation omitted).
118. Franklin, supra note 30, at 820.
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falsity caused real injury, plaintiffs may bring so many spurious suits
that the aggregate amount of defamation litigation might rise,
thereby increasing defense costs.119
If there were no requirement of actual harm, litigious plaintiffs
might sue for declaratory judgments based on general allegations of
character assassination, involving subjects such as drunkenness, 20
nepotism, 21 or immorality.122 When the statements at issue in these
suits have a basis in fact, a showing of harm may help demonstrate
the extent to which the defendant's statement exceeds the facts.
More often, the disputed statements are so unbelievable that they
elicit sympathy that reaffirms or enhances the plaintiff's reputa-
tion.123 In this event, the plaintiff should not be allowed to badger
the defendant or to consume valuable judicial resources merely to
revenge himself. A related danger is that wealthy plaintiffs might
harass publishers of unpopular reports by forcing them into court
merely to answer the charge that a minor part of a report was in
error. Placing a burden on the plaintiff to show actual harm would
provide a needed "materiality standard"'24 that would deter spurious
lawsuits and ensure that the declaratory judgment fulfills its promise
of reducing the chilling effect.
If defined as "provable injury to reputation," '25 the standard of
actual harm would ensure that the declaratory judgment maintains
its focus on falsity. In a declaratory judgment as well as in a damage
action, "the legitimate function of libel law must be understood as
that of compensating individuals for actual, measurable harm caused
by the conduct of others."' 2 Constitutional doctrine largely abjures
119. See Norris, supra note 49, at 698 ("The desirability of allowing plaintiffs to vindi-
cate themselves through a special finding that a story is false must be weighed against the
danger of encouraging suits by plaintiffs . . . .A proliferation of suits will certainly increase
self-censorship among media that are afraid to risk expensive lawsuits.") (citation omitted).
120. See, e.g., Burnett v. National Enquirer, 7 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1321 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1981) (the Enquirer reported that Carol Burnett was "boisterous" and described her "gig-
gling" after allegedly having knocked over a glass of wine.).
121. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, 11 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1777 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (the Post described Mobil's chairman as having "set up" his son Peter in a shipping
company that later did business with Mobil Oil.).
122. See, e.g., Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 805 F.2d
484 (1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
123. See id. Reverend Falwell, by using expurgated copies of the Hustler parody on the
"Old Time Gospel Hour" and by mailing similar copies to members of the "Moral Majority"
organization, raised more than $800,000 in contributions.
124. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 200 n.81.
125. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation, and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747,
749 (1984).
126. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 66 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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a requirement of proof of observable damage.12 A plaintiff, however,
should be required to demonstrate that the harm he claims to have
suffered is capable of being measured, or at least documented, be-
cause erroneous statements that do not cause perceptible harm to the
plaintiff are unlikely to have actually injured his reputation. Such
statements should "be protected [from defamation liability] if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they
'need . . . to survive.' "128
Moreover, in a declaratory judgment, a plaintiff's introduction
of proof should be limited to evidence of reputational harm, since the
action is intended only to vindicate reputation by exposing inaccu-
rate statements as false. If the defendant's statements have invaded
the plaintiff's rights to privacy or publicity or have caused him emo-
tional distress or mental anguish, then he ought to be required to
satisfy the elements of those distinct tort actions. 129 Permitting the
finder of fact to consider claims of harm based on personal humilia-
tion would divert the trier's attention from the issue of falsity to the
drama of the plaintiff's proving the extent of his subjective injuries.
While considering any sort of damage claim will to some extent
draw the focus away from the issue of falsity, at least examining
harm to reputation is consistent with the idea that the reason our
society wants to rectify defamation is that false statements can lead
third parties to think less highly of the plaintiff.
On the other hand, publishers would truly be liable for all of
their errors if a declaratory judgment (like the Florida tort law up-
held in Time, Inc. v. Firestone) permitted the plaintiff to achieve a
favorable result "without regard to measuring the effect the false-
hood may have had upon a plaintiff's reputation."'2 0 Because "a rule
of strict liability . . . may lead to intolerable self-censorship"' 31 and
some false statements are valuable in that they direct attention to
matters of importance, only falsehoods that cause observable,
127. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760
(1985). The Court states
The rationale of the common law rules has been the experience and judg-
ment of history that "proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many
cases where, from the character of the defamatory words and the circumstances
of publication, it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact."
Id.
128. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
129. See Anderson, supra note 125, at 761. Anderson observes, "States undoubtedly
may adopt tort rules designed to protect nonreputational interests. When those interests are
weighed against first amendment interests, however, they should be required to stand on their
own merits rather than masquerade as reputational interests." Id.
130. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976).
131. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
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reputational harm warrant the granting of a declaratory judgment.
A plaintiff could fulfill the requirement of showing perceptible
harm to reputation by proving that the defendant's defamatory state-
ments went beyond the "tendency" to damage and actually injured
his relationships with other individuals or his standing in the com-
munity. The harm caused by a defamatory statement is that it "ex-
pose[s] another to hatred, ridicule or contempt" and that it
prejudices the victim "in the eyes of a substantial and respectable
minority" of persons.1"' By applying the ideas of time and change to
the broad categories of interpersonal relations and social aversion
contained in the Restatement's definition of defamation, Professor
David A. Anderson has suggested that plaintiffs are capable of prov-
ing at least four distinct types of reputational harm.13 Defamation,
writes Anderson, may damage the plaintiff's existing relations with
others, interfere with the plaintiff's future relations with others, de-
stroy a favorable public image, or create a new, negative public
image. 34
These categories, which include a wide variety of injuries rang-
ing from the loss of friendship, employment, or a business opportu-
nity to a decline in public esteem or popularity, provide a structure
upon which a plaintiff may base his claims of damage. The plaintiff
must establish the nature of his relationship or public image before
the defendant's statement was published in order to prove that the
statement injured him, and he also ought to present evidence that
the publication of the defamation was a legal or proximate cause of
the damage to his reputation. 3 5 Witnesses who testify that they
think less highly of the plaintiff should explain why they have
formed their opinions. But, if the plaintiff attempts to prove harm to
his image with evidence consisting solely of changes in such mea-
sures as fan mail, audience attendance, ratings, or electoral results,
then perhaps the court might fairly allow the jury to infer causation
once the plaintiff has demonstrated actual injury.' 6
Because the declaratory judgment provides a finding of falsity
132. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 559 comments b, e (1977). For example, a
defamatory communication might "disparage another by reflecting unfavorably upon his per-
sonal morality or integrity or it may consist of imputations which, while not affecting another's
personal reputation, . . . discredit his financial standing in the community." Id. at § 559,
comment b.
133. See Anderson, supra note 125, at 765-66.
134. Id.
135. See Ehrhardt, Reputation and Character in Defamation Actions, 64 WASh. U.L.Q.
867, 874 (1976).
136. See Anderson, supra note 125, at 773.
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and not a variable range of monetary damages, the plaintiff should
not have to prove the full scope of his injury. Instead, he should pre-
sent evidence that would support a finding that the observable harm
to his reputation was substantial or significant. To satisfy this stan-
dard, a plaintiff might arrange for his associates or those community
members who have acted or altered their opinions based on the de-
fendant's statement to testify in his favor."' 7 Fact-finders would then
use the traditional protective mechanisms of cross-examination, the
oath to tell the truth, and the assessment of demeanor to evaluate
witnesses' credibility. Alternatively, the plaintiff might present the
results of properly administered surveys of public opinion, which as
one commentator argues, "more accurately measure the existence
and extent of any actual injury to the plaintiff's reputation as a re-
sult of the publication.' " Because surveys would be expensive,
plaintiffs would pursue evidence in this manner only if they and their
lawyers believed that they were likely to prevail and to receive an
award of attorneys' fees. By demonstrating substantial, quantifiable
injury to reputation, the plaintiff will prove that the alleged falsity of
the defendant's statements is an issue that deserves the court's
attention.
The objective of reducing self-censorship by the media justifies
assigning the plaintiff a burden of proving both falsity and actual
harm, but the most important step to achieve that objective is to
completely prohibit the use of discovery in declaratory judgment ac-
tions. The constitutional privileges, while intended to safeguard edi-
torial freedom, have instead "required the searching judicial exami-
nation of the editorial process." 3 9 Defending a libel suit for damages
is very costly because the courts must examine how the story was
researched and written.
Professor Barrett presents two arguments in favor of retaining
discovery in a declaratory judgment action. First, without discovery,
"a publisher could . . . destroy a plaintiff's reputation with devastat-
ing proof of truth at trial.""" Second, limiting discovery allegedly
undercuts the declaratory judgment's purpose of determining the
"truth. '"1 4 Barrett's contentions, however, are both inconsistent and
unpersuasive. In a declaratory judgment action, a court should eval-
137. See FED. R. EviD. 803(21) (exception to the hearsay rule for reputation of a per-
son's character among his associates or in the community).
138. See Ehrhardt, supra note 135, at 878.
139. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 209.
140. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 878.
141. Id.
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uate the truth or falsity of the facts without regard to the issue of
surprise. Moreover, the plaintiff is helped by discovery only in the
rare instance in which the defendant has evidence demonstrating the
actual falsity of its own report that the plaintiff could not otherwise
acquire. Consequently, one may conclude that "discovery is not es-
sential to assure that a court's subsequent adjudication of the issues
is accorded legitimacy ... "I'l
Franklin, whose proposal for a declaratory judgment provides
for "no pretrial discovery of any sort,"' 4 observes that media insur-
ance companies have found that plaintiffs have not used discovery to
acquire information on falsity. 44 The Supreme Court in Herbert v.
Lando45 decided not to limit the plaintiff's use of discovery against
media defendants on the ground that doing so would enhance the
burden of proving fault. 46 The declaratory judgment, however, does
not include a fault requirement; the constitutional interest in avoid-
ing self-censorship by publishers therefore is sufficiently important to
deny discovery regarding the editorial process. Although a specific
prohibition on discovery would require a change in rules of proce-
dure, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules has not consid-
ered any proposals limited specifically to a declaratory judgment. 4
The Committee's past decisions to reject proposals narrowing discov-
ery do not constitute an insurmountable obstacle. Because discovery
into editorial decisionmaking threatens the suppression of truthful
information, and because "plaintiffs know much about the facts nec-
essary to litigate falsity,"'I4 the use of discovery should be prohibited
in suits for declaratory judgments.
IV. Application to All Plaintiffs
Allowing all plaintiffs to elect a declaratory judgment action in
lieu of a damage suit would further the interests of plaintiffs, defend-
ants, and the courts. Both public and private plaintiffs have a strong
interest in vindicating their reputations. Defamation may cause a
public plaintiff to lose business or prestige but a private plaintiff's
loss of his job or the respect of his community is equally injurious.
142. See Franklin, supra note 30, at 829.
143. Id. at 812.
144. Id. at 828.
145. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
146. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175-76 (1979).
147. See Cendali, Of Things to Come-The Actual Impact of Herbert v. Lando and a
Proposed National Correction Statute, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 441, 480-81 (1985) [hereinafter
Cendali, Of Things to Come].
148. Franklin, supra note 30, at 829.
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Private plaintiffs in particular do not have the same opportunity as
public plaintiffs to have their views aired by the media. Conse-
quently, they have a greater need for judicial determination of the
truth or falsity of the allegedly defamatory statement. The Schumer
bill, however, would provide a declaratory judgment action only to
public officials or public figures.149 Barrett writes, "Giving certain
private plaintiffs, such as wealthy and private individuals and corpo-
rations, the added remedy of a declaratory judgment will generate a
strong chilling effect." 150 Yet, the declaratory judgment would not
be an additional remedy. As Franklin and Barrett both recognize, a
plaintiff who brings an action for a declaratory judgment must be
"forever barred from asserting any other claim or cause of action
arising out of a publication or broadcast which is the subject of such
action." 151
Moreover, part of the justification for creating a declaratory
judgment action is that, by eliminating the focus on fault and plac-
ing burdens of proof with respect to falsity and harm on the plaintiff,
the chilling effect on publishers produced by damage suits will be
reduced. Franklin's proposal, which allows all plaintiffs to bring a
declaratory judgment action,"'2 would accomplish more fully the
goal of making falsity and reputational harm central to libel litiga-
tion than would the Schumer bill. Damage suits are unsatisfying to
plaintiffs1 53 because they often do not reach these issues. Instead,
"the legal status of the plaintiffs must [first] be ascertained in order
to define the existing level of privilege applicable to the case. "154
This preliminary inquiry has become so important that "fully 45
percent of the media libel cases are foreclosed on plaintiff status
grounds without the factual strength of the defamation claim or the
materiality of the harm to reputation being assessed in a trial. 155
For the plaintiffs who lose these cases, the declaratory judgment
would provide a mechanism to address the issue of falsity. Further-
more, plaintiffs who do succeed in establishing the lower level of
privilege are not, in general, significantly more likely to prevail in a
damage case 1 6 than those who do not. They too may view a declara-
149. Id. at 832.
150. Barrett, supra note 31, at 852 n.29.
151. Franklin, supra note 30, at 812, 833. See also Barrett, supra note 31, at 863.
152. Franklin, supra note 30, at 812.
153. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 159-60.
154. Id. at 125.
155. Id. at 125-26.
156. Id. at 112-13. The authors of the Iowa libel study analyzed 427 cases brought by
public figures and 433 cases brought by private figures to determine overall litigation results
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tory judgment that avoids litigating the plaintiff's status as a sim-
pler, more rapid, and less costly method of obtaining a finding of
falsity. Denying any class of plaintiffs the option to bring a declara-
tory judgment is undesirable because it forces them to pursue a dam-
age action which may never achieve an adjudication of falsity or
harm to reputation.
Making the declaratory judgment available to all plaintiffs
would also benefit both publishers and the judicial system. If private
figures are limited to damage suits, the press and nonmedia defend-
ants will continue to be subject to great risk of monetary liability. 157
This is especially so because of the "ease with which negligence can
be shown to flow from error." ' Plaintiffs should be encouraged to
choose a remedy that does not allow extensive discovery of the pub-
lisher's thought processes or huge damage awards for its negligent
conduct. Removing the distinction between public and private figures
will also simplify the litigation of a declaratory judgment and thus
reduce publishers' defense costs. Moreover, making the declaratory
judgment available to all plaintiffs will save the courts valuable time
and effort. In damage actions, the task of determining the plaintiff's
status is ill-defined and confusing.159 Therefore, in a declaratory
judgment action (where there is no need to apply a particular stan-
dard of fault) no good reason exists for wasting judicial resources on
characterizing the plaintiff in this manner.
Certainly the rationale given by the Supreme Court in Gertz for
distinguishing between public and private plaintiffs-that public
figures enjoy greater access to the channels of effective communica-
and found that public plaintiffs were successful in 12% of their cases and that private plain-
tiffs were successful in 17% of their cases.
157. Since both media and nonmedia publishers contribute significantly to public debate
and the exchange of ideas, the declaratory judgment must apply to all types of defendants. See
Franklin, supra note 30, at 815. Franklin writes, "Nonmedia defendants, such as persons who
write letters to the editor and persons who circulate petitions, need the protection of . . . [a
declaratory judgment] as much as, if not more than media defendants." See also Barrett,
supra note 31, at 852 where the author concludes that "there seems little reason to limit the
new action to media defendants ...."
158. Franklin, supra note 30, at 841 n.131.
159. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 202. The distinction be-
tween public and private plaintiffs
has generated so much confusion and inconsistency in its application by the
courts . . . . [T]he issue is one that has drawn courts into the most subtle and
minute determinations, and has required judgments at the pre-trial stage con-
cerning particularized and specific questions about the plaintiff's history, actions,
and their relationship to the challenged publication. In broad terms, this has
yielded a patchwork of decisions that are wholly case- and fact-specific, and that
defy even the best of efforts to draw general patterns or rules in all but the most
highly abstract form.
Id.
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tion and that they run the risk of greater public scrutiny' 6 0-- does
not justify limiting a declaratory judgment action to public figures.
This rationale has been widely questioned.1 61 Creating a declaratory
judgment that is available to all plaintiffs will lessen the self-censor-
ship by publishers that occurs now and will facilitate the determina-
tion of truth or falsity in the future by the courts.
V. A Federal Declaratory Judgment
The declaratory judgment should be created through federal
rather than state legislation. The advantages to litigants, the ease of
administration, and the decreased chilling effect of a uniform law
outweigh the value of allowing each state to define for itself the par-
ticular elements of an action for a declaration of falsity. One argu-
ment in favor of permitting states to create a multitude of declara-
tory judgment actions is that the procedure would be a new remedy
with which the states should freely experiment to determine what
works best. 62 There are two important problems with this position.
First, experts in defamation law recognize the need for reform and
stress that changes must consolidate and rationalize the law instead
of offering further complications.' 6 Second, Congress could hear a
very wide range of sources, including representative plaintiffs and
defendants, before enacting a declaratory judgment action,16' and it
could adjust, without much difficulty, a procedure that was later
found to be problematic.
A stronger argument in favor of using state law to create the
declaratory judgment is that the states have traditionally been the
defender of the individual's reputation. This argument derives sup-
port from the premise underlying constitutional doctrines on libel
that "[t]he protection of private personality . . . is left primarily to
the individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.' 6 5
160. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
161. See Tribe, supra note 112, at 641. See also Branson & Spraue, The Public Fig-
ure-Private Person Dichotomy: A Flight From First Amendment Reality, 90 DICK. L. REV.
627, 628 (1986); BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 203.
162. Franklin, supra note 30, at 819.
163. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 879. Barrett, who would use federal legislation to
create a declaratory judgment, shares the views of many commentators on the libel crisis when
he writes, "Even though libel is a state-created cause of action, the common law tort has now
been so altered and constrained by application of federal constitutional standards that rational-
izing the system on a nationwide basis is essential." See also BEZANSON, CRANBERG &
SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 203; Smolla, Taking Libel Reform Seriously, 38 MERCER L. REV.
793 (1987); Forer, supra note 72, at 310-11.
164. See Forer, supra note 72, at 319.
165. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92-93 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
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Thus, when the Supreme Court applied the standard of fault to cases
involving private figures, it acted "in recognition of the strong and
legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for in-
jury to reputation."' 66 The states play an important role in protect-
ing reputation because defamation is defined, in part, as an injury to
an individual's standing in a local community; thus, the idea that
each community should define its own policy on libel law is attrac-
tive. 167 The flaw in this argument is that while defamatory state-
ments may injure "the aspects of personal identity that stem from
membership in the general community," 168 a remedy may be effec-
tive without incorporating particular community values, especially if
it concentrates on a relatively objective determinant of liability, such
as falsity. Moreover, although the harm is perhaps local, a uniform
response would more fully reflect a national commitment to promot-
ing freedom of speech than would a number of divergent state
enactments.
A federally created declaratory judgment would reduce both
plaintiffs' and defendants' expenses and would simplify the process
of adjudicating libel disputes. At present, thirty-three states have
different retraction statutes, ten states have distinct privacy statutes,
and state statutes of limitation range from one to four years. 69
Plaintiffs may bring suit in the state that offers the most favorable
substantive and procedural rules, provided that the defendant has in-
tentionally published in that forum. 17  Consequently, authors "must
be prepared not only to defend actions in the federal courts and the
courts of all fifty states, but under fifty different bodies of law."''
This system unduly burdens multistate publishers "by making it next
to impossible to satisfy the requirements of each state in which they
publish,"17 and by making it very expensive to defend a suit in a
166. 418 U.S. at 348-49.
167. See Franklin, supra note 30, at 819. See generally Post, supra note 55, at 707-19.
168. Post, supra note 55, at 715.
169. Forer, supra note 72, at 311.
170. The most notable example is the case of Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465
U.S. 770 (1986), in which the Supreme Court upheld a nonresident plaintiff's claim of juris-
diction in New Hampshire, where the defendant distributed 10,000-15,000 issues per month of
its nationally-read magazine, even though that state was the only forum whose statute of limi-
tations allowed the plaintiff to sue. The Court stressed, "The tort of libel is generally held to
occur wherever the offending material is circulated" and that "the victim of a libel ... may
choose to bring suit in any forum with which the defendant has 'certain minimum contacts
. . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.'" Id. at 777-81.
171. Forer, supra note 72, at 311.
172. Note, The Defamed Reputation: Will Declaratory Judgment Bill Provide Vindica-
tion, 13 J. OF LEGIS. 72, 86 (1986) [hereinafter Defamed Reputation]. See also Bender, A
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distant forum.173 If states are allowed to create their own declaratory
judgment remedies, they may add fo the inconvenience and expense
incurred by publishers by establishing different statutes of limitation,
different burdens of proof, and different requirements of actual
harm. Furthermore, individual states may impose varying restric-
tions on the availability of the cause of action to certain types of
plaintiffs and inconsistent rules coordinating the action with damage
suits.
On the other hand, a federal action would promote fairness be-
tween the litigants by reducing any incentive for either side to jockey
for a particular forum. Both plaintiffs and defendants would benefit
from the certainty of a uniform law that "permits lawyers to restrict
their case preparation to a limited number of issues, and thus
reduces the costs of litigation."'1 74 Defendants, in particular, would
be less likely to avoid controversial subjects if they knew precisely
what legal rules governed liability for defamation. In addition, a uni-
form federal standard would enable courts to learn from other
courts' application of the law and therefore to reach timely decisions
about the accuracy of disputed statements.
Finally, because it is a national body, Congress is less likely to
be influenced by "antipress sentiment ' 175 and more likely to create
legislation that appropriately balances concerns for reputation and
freedom of speech.' 76 Congress could use its authority to regulate
interstate commerce to create a federal action applicable to commu-
nications distributed in many states. 77 Section five of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution may be interpreted to
support congressional authority to regulate libel suits against all
publications in order to assure equal treatment of all defendants.17 8
Once exerted, federal authority would prevent state actions designed
to circumvent the declaratory judgment's procedures from being ef-
fective. Thus, a federal declaratory judgment act would simplify the
adjudication of libel suits and would contribute to an environment in
which publication decisions are based upon considerations of accu-
Suggestion to End the Struggle Over Libel, 38 MERCER L. REV. 809, 813 (1987).
173. See Forer, supra note 72, at 312-13; Cendali, Of Things to Come, supra note 147,
at 453.
174. Forer, supra note 72, at 316.
175. Barrett, supra note 31, at 879.
176. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) is a good example of how a state
that was willing to protect reputation at all costs was quite ready to decide that a publisher,
who seemed to endorse views that were not widely held in that state, had defamed the plaintiff.
177. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
178. See Defamed Reputation, supra note 172, at 86 n.92.
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racy and newsworthiness rather than concern over the substantial le-
gal costs associated with potential libel suits.
VI. Remedies
A plaintiff should be barred from suing for damages if he elects
the declaratory judgment. The purpose of creating the new action is
to quickly remedy the harm to plaintiffs' reputation by means of a
procedure that reduces media self-censorship. Reducing self-censor-
ship would be impossible to achieve if plaintiffs could sue for dam-
ages after having obtained a judgment of falsity. Barrett rightly
points out that "the potential chilling effect of the new remedy
would be enormous. Not only would the defendant face strict liabil-
ity in the declaratory judgment action, but it would also continue to
face the risks of a large damage recovery." '179 If the declaratory
judgment is to serve the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants
better than current libel law, it must be the exclusive remedy once
chosen.
On the other hand, plaintiffs should be entitled at the outset to
choose between a declaratory judgment or a suit for damages. Since
some defamatory statements produce real financial harm, the contin-
ued provision for a damage remedy supplies a valuable deterrent to
maliciously or intentionally defamatory publications. An examina-
tion of the reasons the Schumer bill "would grant media defendants
sued by public figures the right to convert the damage action into a
new action for a declaratory judgment" 8 demonstrates that plain-
tiffs ought to have the choice as to which remedy they will pursue.
Under the Schumer bill, "upon a defendant's election, the plaintiff
would be barred from recovering any damages caused by publication
of the statement at issue.11 81 The idea, according to Barrett, is that
only a "defendant's option" will firmly eliminate "the chilling effect
of massive damage claims and occasional verdicts. 18 1 Self-censor-
ship, however, is not a function of the existence of a damage action
but of the frequency with which plaintiffs select it. Plaintiffs, who
are primarily concerned with obtaining a declaration of falsity, 183
will bring the simpler, faster, and less expensive declaratory judg-
ment action. This is especially true when the plaintiff is confident
that he will prevail, as well as receive an award of attorneys' fees. As
179. Barrett, supra note 31, at 863 n.98.
180. Id. at 852.
181. Id. See also Franklin, supra note 30, at 833-34.
182. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 867.
183. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 160, 175.
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the declaratory judgment is used more frequently, it will become
more effective at reducing the chilling effect.
To eliminate damage suits completely, however, in order to pro-
tect robust debate is to undervalue the interests of libel plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs who choose the more complex and costly damage suit in-
stead of the declaratory judgment route are more likely to have actu-
ally incurred pecuniary loss.184 Because these plaintiffs have exper-
ienced harm that a declaration of falsity will not cure, "it is hard to
justify the de facto elimination of damage awards in virtually all
cases."1 85 Nevertheless, Barrett defends the defendant's option by
denying the existence and the significance of harm suffered by plain-
tiffs. He argues that many plaintiffs sue not to recover for harm but
to harass defendants; that plaintiffs who incur harm often lose be-
cause they are unable to prove the requisite level of fault; and that
not all plaintiffs who can prove fault have suffered significant
harm. 8' Although all these assertions have merit, none justifies
prohibiting plaintiffs who have lost jobs, contracts, or other business
opportunities from receiving monetary compensation.
A significant number of injured plaintiffs, both public and pri-
vate, do ultimately prevail in damage suits, despite having to show
that the defendant was at fault."8 Moreover, plaintiffs frequently
are victorious primarily because they have strong, substantive
claims. 88 Courts may discourage harassment by limiting damages,
awarding attorney fees,189 or imposing alternative sanctions. Barrett
emphasizes that since his proposal offers the declaratory judgment
only to public figures, very few plaintiffs "would lose significant ac-
tual recoveries if damage suits were largely eliminated through the
defendant's option.""'  Nevertheless, denying monetary recovery to
all public plaintiffs might itself produce inequity, 1' and, more im-
184. See id. at 160. The Iowa libel study found that of the 10 percent of plaintiffs who
would precondition their interest in an alternative remedy on the availability of money dam-
ages, more than half either won in litigation, settled, or experienced financial harm compensa-
ble only through money damages.
185. Franklin, supra note 30, at 837-38.
186. Barrett, supra note 31, at 865-66.
187. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 113. In cases studied be-
tween 1974 and 1984, 38 of 427 public figure plaintiffs and 53 of 433 private figure plaintiffs
ultimately won their suits.
188. Id. at 143.
189. See infra notes 229-44 and accompanying text.
190. Barrett, supra note 31, at 866-67, n.122. The author notes that LDRC surveys
indicate that between 1980 and 1984 only nine awards based on a showing of actual malice
were upheld.
191. See Franklin, supra note 30, at 840. Franklin observes that low-level public officials
and involuntary public figures would face great hardship if damage suits were prohibited.
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portantly, limiting the application of the declaratory judgment will
neither clarify libel doctrine nor reduce the chilling effect. Private
plaintiffs are more likely to suffer economic harm than public plain-
tiffs 92 and a declaration of falsity probably will not enable private
individuals to recoup their financial losses. An efficient and fair de-
claratory judgment procedure that applies to all plaintiffs should not
foreclose the option of pursuing a suit for damages.
Although the prospect of losing a declaratory judgment action
ought to deter the publication of defamatory statements,19 an action
for damages is necessary as an additional deterrent. Certainly
Franklin goes too far when he writes that "the defendant's election
removes any deterrent effect of libel law,''194 since plaintiffs' victories
in declaratory judgments would in fact "exact a large price on the
reputations of defendants for accuracy. ' 195 Some publishers, how-
ever, such as those whose message "is pitched to a faithful political
or religious following," 96 may not be discouraged by judicial find-
ings of falsity. Moreover, "the small publisher or broadcaster who
has great local power but lacks ethical standards may be tempted by
the defendant's election to defame intentionally." ' 97 Irresponsible
publishers, however, cannot estimate litigation costs and damage
awards precisely, even if the average risk of liability is as low as five
or ten percent. If the spectre of large damage judgments and legal
fees chills law-abiding publishers, then the reality of having to pay
such costs may ultimately deter irresponsible publishers. The impor-
tance of reducing the present chilling effect warrants creation of a
declaratory judgment action. But the unfairness of denying damages
to plaintiffs who have incurred economic harm, and the reduced de-
terrence caused by prohibiting damage suits entirely, support an ap-
proach based on the plaintiff's election.
The declaratory judgment remedy should attract plaintiffs be-
cause it provides an easier and more certain method of repairing
harm to reputation than a traditional suit for damages. Although it
would not produce a financial award, the declaratory judgment
would deliver a formal judicial finding about the truth or falsity of
192. BEZANSON. CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 161.
193. See supra pp. 9-11.
194. See Franklin, supra note 30, at 839.
195. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 871.
196. Franklin, supra note 30, at 839.
197. Id. Barrett seems ready to concede that such publishers will inevitably make false
and defamatory statements when he presumes that "the social deviant has calculated that the
incremental benefits of misconduct are greater than the marginal risk of punishment." Barrett,
supra note 31, at 372.
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disputed statements through a procedure more rapid and less expen-
sive than a damage suit. It would-require a plaintiff to demonstrate
that his reputation had been damaged by a false and defamatory
statement. The plaintiff, however, could obtain a judgment without
having to litigate questions concerning his status or the defendant's
fault. Nevertheless, since plaintiffs could choose between a declara-
tory judgment action or a damage suit, the question remains as to
which route the majority of plaintiffs would pursue.
Barrett is rightly concerned that plaintiffs seeking to harass de-
fendants will always select the more expensive damage suit. Franklin
also asks "Will Eligible Plaintiffs Make the Election?" '198 An affirm-
ative answer is essential if the declaratory judgment and its goal of
reducing the chilling effect are to succeed. The constitutional privi-
leges, the goal of protecting free speech, and the distinction between
public and private plaintiffs appear firmly established in the law.199
Well-reasoned legislative proposals, however, could create a uniform
burden of proof for plaintiffs or place fixed limits on damages to
protect both the publisher's freedom of speech and the individual's
interest in reputation.
Requiring plaintiffs to meet a rigorous standard of proof in or-
der to prevail in a damage suit would encourage the use of the de-
claratory judgment and would provide a needed measure of freedom
to the expression of controversial ideas. Franklin suggests that a
plaintiff in a damage suit, whether a public or private figure, should
prove not only that the statement was false but also that the defend-
ant acted with actual malice."°° Why would universal imposition of
the actual malice standard lead plaintiffs to choose a declaratory
judgment? Would applying the actual malice test to all plaintiffs
fairly balance first amendment and reputational interests?
At present, nearly ninety percent of defamation cases "turn
largely on the privilege issues of plaintiff status and privilege appli-
cation."20 1 Given the legal difficulty involved and the substantial
length of time required to prove actual malice, most plaintiffs who
have not incurred substantial economic harm probably would select
a remedy that requires only proof of falsity and harm to reputation.
Vengeful plaintiffs who want to put publishers to great expense
would still bring damage suits. Elimination of the distinction be-
198. Franklin, supra note 30, at 825.
199. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
200. See Franklin, supra note 30, at 813.
201. See BEZANSON. CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 125.
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tween plaintiffs, however, would make such harassment less effective
by simplifying the litigation in libel cases.20 2 The majority of plain-
tiffs, if confronted initially with a motion for summary judgment on
actual malice, would likely view a declaratory judgment action as a
more rewarding alternative to a damage suit.
Furthermore, the realities of litigation and the tenets of first
amendment theory make a standard that limits liability to reckless
or intentional conduct essential to protect the expression of contro-
versial information and ideas. General fault standards, including
negligence, allow fact-finders to condemn speech that offends them
by merely pointing to the publisher's failure to confirm informa-
tion.2" As Laurence Tribe writes, allowing states the flexibility to
create simple fault standards
is dangerous inasmuch as jurors are likely to represent
majoritarian attitudes toward unpopular speakers and ideas.
Given its heavy dependence on how jurors will react, "fault" is
not a standard which promises the predictable results or creates
the certain expectations without which journalists and others
may too often "kill" or emasculate reports they believe to be
true because of the threat of a libel action.'"
At least one commentator has argued that courts will gradually
develop "a comprehensive set of judicial guidelines for establishing
negligence in journalism."205 The Iowa libel study, which is a de-
tailed examination of defamation cases spanning an entire decade,
demonstrates that the Gertz rules governing plaintiff status have pro-
duced neither the clarity nor consistency of adjudication necessary to
prevent the chilling of expression.20 6 Because "it is a small jump
from finding an error to concluding that someone in the [defend-
ant's] operation behaved unreasonably, ' 20 7 only the actual malice
standard assures "to the freedoms of speech and the press that
'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise."20 8
The Gertz rules, moreover, derive from a one-sided concern
about limiting reputational harm and not (despite the Supreme
Court's expressed goal) from a considered balance of the risk of such
202. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
203. See Franklin, supra note 30, at 823.
204. Tribe, supra note 112, at 645. See also Anderson, supra note 76, at 460-61.
205. Bloom, Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND. L. REv. 247,
389 (1985).
206. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 203.
207. Franklin, supra note 30, at 823.
208. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
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harm with the first amendment objective of encouraging debate. In
Gertz, the Court rejected the Rosenbloom test20 9 because of the du-
bious wisdom of allowing judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which
publications address issues of public interest, and because of the
"drastic" difference between the actual malice and the common law
standards of liability. 10 The Court might have relied upon the even
stronger reason that a publication's public or private nature ought to
be irrelevant to whether or not an individual has been defamed, since
it is the presence or absence of a false statement that is central to
defamation. The Court, however, viewed the "abridgement of the
state law right to compensation for wrongful harm to one's reputa-
tion" as the principal danger in libel law, and it sought a practical
way to limit the "high price" exacted from "victims of defamatory
falsehood."21 It distinguished between plaintiffs, arguing that pri-
vate individuals are more deserving of recovery than public figures,
because the latter assume the risk of closer public scrutiny and have
a greater chance of being able to respond through the media to de-
famatory statements.212
The Court's logic in Gertz, while perhaps adequate to justify the
requirment that public plaintiffs meet a greater burden of proof than
private plaintiffs, does not demonstrate why a negligence standard is
a proper accommodation of interests between reputation and free-
dom of speech.213 Having set the actual malice standard for public
figures in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,214 the Court was un-
doubtedly constrained by the need to protect reputation when it ad-
duced a lower level of fault for private figures. In doing so, however,
the Court relied upon premises inconsistent with principles which it
had previously recognized as basic to the first amendment's protec-
tion of speech. Most notably, in New York Times, while the Court
limited its holding to public officials, it nevertheless embraced the
broad and enduring idea that "even a false statement may be
deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it
brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth,
209. Id. at 346. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (stating
that "the determinant whether the First Amendment applies to state libel actions is whether
the utterance involved concerns an issue of public or private concern").
210. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 766 (1985) (holding that recovery of presumed and punitive damages
depends on whether or not the defamatory statements involve matters of public concern).
211. 418 U.S. at 343.
212. Id. at 344-45.
213. See BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 203.
214. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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produced by its collision with error.' "1215 Yet, in Gertz, the Court
limited its acceptance of "the competition of other ideas" to matters
of "opinion" when it postulated that "there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact." '216 The Court's qualification is, if not
inconsistent with its language in New York Times, at best a poorly
reasoned distinction. False statements, whether they appear as
"fact" or "opinion," are useful precisely because they elicit correc-
tions or comments that clarify the subject in dispute and lead to a
fuller understanding of the truth.
Franklin's proposal to use actual malice as the sole standard of
fault in all damage cases is sound. Making liability depend upon
recklessness or a purpose to defame, instead of upon the subject at
issue or the plaintiff's status, truly recognizes that "erroneous state-
ment is inevitable in free debate" and that "constitutional protection
does not turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas
and beliefs which are offered.' "21 If the actual malice standard is
required of all plaintiffs who bypass a declaratory judgment, it will
help protect publishers from having to defend expensive damage
suits but will still provide a monetary remedy for plaintiffs who have
been intentionally or recklessly defamed by false statements.
Alternatively, limiting the amount of money recoverable in a
damage suit would succeed as an incentive to plaintiffs to choose a
declaratory judgment remedy, but only if the law continued to re-
quire proof of fault. In a concurring opinion in Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., Justice White suggested that the constitutional doctrines of li-
bel might be intelligently reformed by eliminating the requirement
that plaintiffs prove the defendant's fault and by limiting the dam-
ages that plaintiffs could recover. 18 Justice White criticized New
York Times and Gertz for having "struck an improvident balance
. ..between the public's interest in being fully informed ...and
the competing interest of those who have been defamed in vindicat-
ing their reputation. 2  He argued that plaintiffs have great diffi-
culty proving negligence or actual malice and obtaining a judgment
that the publication was false. 2 0 To redress this injustice, White
proposed a return to the common law standard of liability, under
which plaintiffs were required only to show that the defendant was
215. 376 U.S. at 279 n.19, (quoting J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY).
216. 418 U.S. at 340.
217. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 271.
218. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 766-77.
219. Id. at 767.
220. Id. at 768-71.
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responsible for a false, written publication that subjected the plaintiff
to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.221 Upon proving the publication's
falsity, the plaintiffs "could at least have a judgment to that
effect. 2
Although it was a secondary matter for him, Justice White also
considered the problem of "possibly intimidating damages liabil-
ity. ' 212 He would have controlled the chilling effect "by limiting the
recoverable damages to a level that would not unduly threaten the
press. 224 In particular, White proposed forbidding punitive damages
and prohibiting presumed harm to reputation.225
By leaving publishers liable for actual damages upon a mere
showing of falsity, however, Justice White did not go far enough to
protect first amendment freedoms. He was correct that the press
should not be immune from suits to establish falsity, and indeed he
seems to have advocated a declaratory judgment.2 ' But he failed to
understand the significance of defendants' having to pay the substan-
tial litigation costs discussed earlier and the chilling effect on pub-
lishers such as the Alton Telegraph when he argued that because
"other commercial enterprises in this country not in the business of
disseminating information must pay for the damage they cause as a
cost of doing business," the press and other writers should, too.
227
The press, and publishers generally, perform a special function
as the source by which people learn about artistic, economic, politi-
cal, and military developments. A declaratory judgment remedy
would balance the important role publishers play in conveying infor-
mation with the individual's interest in protecting his reputation. It
would accomplish this by providing a method of countering harmful
misinformation while not interrupting the process through which in-
formation is conveyed. If Justice White's proposals were adopted,
plaintiffs might choose exclusively to bring damage suits since they
could recover monetary awards by presenting the same proof of fal-
sity that would be required in a declaratory judgment action.
Plaintiffs might be encouraged to choose a declaratory judg-
221. Id. at 771-73, 763-67.




226. Id. at 774. Justice White wrote, "A legislative solution to the damages problem
would also be appropriate. . . . I can. . . discern nothing in the Constitution which forbids a
plaintiff from obtaining a judicial decree that a statement is false-a decree he can then use in
the community to clear his name and to prevent further damage from a defamation already
published." Id.
227. 472 U.S. at 772.
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ment action if the fault privileges in damage suits remained in place,
and if recovery were limited to demonstrated monetary harm. Mak-
ing "pecuniary loss" the standard would prevent plaintiffs from re-
ceiving awards for mental anguish, humiliation, or emotional distress
in a suit for defamation. Such a limitation may make damage suits
less attractive. More than one commentator has argued cogently that
"a rule of 'actual harm shown,' not exceeded by the damages actu-
ally awarded, seems solidly grounded in conservative first amend-
ment orthodoxy." 28
Nevertheless, because "pecuniary" harm might be interpreted
broadly, limiting damages would not be as effective as establishing a
uniform standard of actual malice to persuade plaintiffs to choose
the declaratory judgment option. Nor would limiting damages sub-
stantially reduce the magnitude of the present chilling effect. De-
fendants would still incur great expense litigating the issues of plain-
tiff status and public or private concern. In addition, adjudicating
the issue of what harm qualifies as "pecuniary" would increase the
length and complexity of trials. Since litigation costs, and not mone-
tary awards, comprise the bulk of defendants' expenses in damage
suits, requiring all plaintiffs to prove actual malice if they choose a
damage suit would provide greater breathing room for publishers.
VII. Awarding Attorneys' Fees
Even if legislative reform makes recovery in damage suits more
difficult, plaintiffs may choose not to pursue a declaratory judgment
if they think that a damage suit will be less expensive. But plaintiffs
may be willing to bring a declaratory judgment action if they know
in advance that they can recoup their attorneys' fees if they are suc-
cessful. Despite the long-standing "American rule" that each side
pays its own attorney's fees, "Congress has enacted an extensive ar-
ray of statutes containing fee-shifting provisions designed to en-
courage private enforcement and to effectuate important legislative
policies."22 9 Incorporation of a provision awarding the winning party
attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action would assist plain-
tiffs in their efforts to restore their reputation and at the same time
would protect publishers from having to pay the expenses of un-
founded suits.
Franklin and Barrett recognize the benefits to both plaintiffs
228. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 802. See also Anderson, supra note 125, at 760.
229. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys' Fees For Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L.
REV. 613, 614, n.8 (1983).
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and defendants of fee shifting provisions.2 a More specifically, com-
mentators concerned with protecting plaintiffs' rights have criticized
the American rule for discouraging suits involving small amounts of
money.2 31 Since a declaratory judgment provides no damages, this
criticism is especially relevant in assessing the success of the new
action. Without a fee award, plaintiffs may choose the damage route
because it enables them to hire a lawyer more easily on a contin-
gency basis. On the other hand, plaintiffs seeking damages regularly
pay a portion of the fees or costs of bringing suit. Even though
eighty-six percent of plaintiffs engage counsel on a contingency fee
basis, fifty-three percent pay some sort of fee. In eighty-one-and-a-
half percent of contingency cases, plaintiffs bear some of the costs of
representation. 2 If there is a fee award for the winning party in a
declaratory judgment action, therefore, plaintiffs who believe they
have a meritorious claim may be more willing to pursue a declara-
tion of falsity, since such findings would restore their reputations at
little or no cost to them.
Some plaintiffs, who might have been willing to pay their own
fees but who are uncertain about whether they will prevail, may be
discouraged from seeking a declaratory judgment by the fear that
they will have to pay the defendant's attorney's fees as well. The
defendant's fees, however, will be comparatively low in a declaratory
judgment action that requires the plaintiffs to demonstrate falsity
and harm to reputation and that forbids the use of discovery. More
importantly, the plaintiff in any libel case should carefully consider
the strength of his claim before bringing suit. Finally, libel plaintiffs
win only twelve to seventeen percent of their suits for damages.233
Therefore, many plaintiffs may decide that a finding of falsity along
with an award of attorneys' fees provides a faster, more successful,
and perhaps less expensive way of vindicating their dignity than a
prolonged struggle for damages.
A declaratory judgment action that includes a fee-shifting pro-
vision will make both plaintiffs and their lawyers think twice before
230. See Franklin, supra note 30, at 813, 834. Their recognition is apparent in the gen-
eral rule that they advocate, which is: "in any action arising out of a publication or broadcast
which is alleged to be false and defamatory, the court shall award the prevailing party reason-
able attorneys' fees." Id.
231. See Mallor, supra note 229, at 616 ("A potential plaintiff who has a meritorious
but small claim will often suffer the injustice done to him rather than bring an action, because
any judgment he might recover would be equalled or exceeded by the cost of bringing the
action.").
232. BEZANSON, CRANBERG & SOLOSKI, supra note 2, at 69-72.
233. Id. at 112.
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initiating suit. It will not, however, prevent plaintiffs with a strong
claim from acquiring counsel to represent them. At present, plain-
tiffs' attorneys greatly exaggerate the likelihood of winning libel suits
when they confer with their clients. The Iowa libel study found, for
example, that "[sleventy-two percent of the responding plaintiffs
were advised by their attorney that the prospects of success were 50
percent or greater."2 " Libel attorneys were particularly optimistic in
predicting plaintiff success when they stood to share in an award of
damages. Fifty percent of lawyers hired by hourly fees do not recom-
mend suit, while only twenty-two percent of lawyers hired by contin-
gency fee do not do so.135 Since the plaintiff in a declaratory judg-
ment action would not receive a verdict of damages in which his
attorney could share, most attorneys will probably accept such cases
only with hourly fee arrangements.
Some lawyers, however, may agree to seek a declaratory judg-
ment on a contingency fee basis in cases in which there appears to be
a strong claim on the merits. To encourage representation by contin-
gency fee, lawyers might be allowed to contract with clients to re-
present them on the condition that the client must reject any settle-
ment offer that excludes a fee in quantum meruit for the lawyer's
services. Occasionally, lawyers may take cases on a contingency ba-
sis for a fee award when they are unsure of the probable outcome.236
The Iowa study concluded that "[n]early half of the lawyers appear
to have little impact on the plaintiff's decision to sue, and 60 percent
were less than 'very important.' "I7 For plaintiffs seeking a declara-
tory judgment, most attorneys are likely to play an important role.
Plaintiffs' lawyers will give more realistic advice about the likelihood
of winning, and by rejecting weak or unsupported claims, attorneys
will function beneficially to reduce the aggregate volume of libel
litigation.
Developing detailed rules in addition to general fee-shifting pro-
visions may provide plaintiffs with a more precise indication of when
they can recover fees. Such rules, however, would weaken the declar-
atory judgment's focus on falsity. Moreover, giving plaintiffs greater
assurance of fee recovery would have the undesirable effect of in-
creasing the overall amount of libel litigation. In an action for a de-
claratory judgment, Professor Franklin proposes that "a prevailing
234. Id. at 72.
235. Id. at 75.
236. Id. at 76.
237. Id.
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defendant shall not be awarded attorneys' fees if the plaintiff has
brought and maintained the action with a reasonable chance of suc-
cess and presented or formally tried to present to the defendant evi-
dence that the statement was false and defamatory before the action
was filed." 38 In support of this proposed rule, Franklin argues that if
the declaratory judgment is to succeed using an approach based on
the plaintiff's election, "the plaintiff must be given some reasonable
expectation about when he can recover fees."23 9
Franklin's proposal also encourages the parties to negotiate a
settlement before commencing litigation. Nevertheless, it still has
several problems. First, making attorneys' fees depend on the reason-
ableness with which the plaintiff assesses his prospects of winning
complicates the court's determination of whether the publication was
actually false. Second, courts are likely to find on a regular basis 4"
that plaintiffs had a reasonable chance of success and thus negate
the valuable deterrent effect of requiring unsuccessful plaintiffs to
pay the defendant's attorneys' fees. Finally, if the defendant refuses
to alter or retract his story, the Franklin rule draws attention to the
reasonableness of that decision.
Although Franklin stresses that only the defendant's "postpubli-
cation conduct" is under scrutiny, the rule reintroduces the issue of
fault. If adopted, it might lead editors to withhold stories not be-
cause of doubts about their veracity, but because of fear of liability.
By comparison, the Schumer bill purports to protect the defendant
from having to pay the plaintiff's attorneys' fees when the defendant
shows that it has taken reasonable care to avoid the publication of a
libel or that it published a retraction within ten days after service of
the complaint.2 '1 The very presence of this rule may lead courts to
expect defendants to make a showing of diligence. As Barrett ad-
mits, his provision "reinject[s] the issue of the defendant's state of
mind into the declaratory judgment action."242 If a defendant re-
tracts his statement, courts may justly award attorneys' fees to the
plaintiff for litigation expenses incurred during the period before the
retraction and to the defendant for any attorneys' fees incurred
thereafter. " If the award of attorneys' fees depends on whether or
238. Franklin, supra note 30, at 813 (Proposed Plaintiff's Option Libel Reform Act §
4(b)(2)).
239. Id. at 842.
240. See Barrett, supra note 31, at 874.
241. Id. at 875.
242. Id.
243. Franklin, supra note 30, at 813 (Proposed Plaintiff's Option Libel Reform Act §
4(b)(4)).
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not the press has exercised reasonable care or refused to retract, then
"the issue of fault is clearly still with us, because reasonable care is
going to involve the same inquiries into the reporter's interviews,
sources, and state of mind . . . . 244 The declaratory judgment's
contribution to the simplification of libel law is better served by giv-
ing courts a limited measure of discretion to decide when it would be
inequitable to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party than by
establishing a variety of specific exceptions to a general rule of fee-
shifting.
VIII. Conclusion
The constitutional privileges in libel law focus on the determina-
tion of the defendant's fault. Because liability depends upon proof of
negligence or actual malice, plaintiffs rarely obtain a judgment on
the truth or falsity of a publication. Publishers regularly incur great
expenses defending their good intentions or the reasonableness of
their conduct, and courts spend a disproportionate amount of time
deciding issues unrelated to the questions of defamation and reputa-
tional harm. A declaratory judgment remedy, however, would give
the plaintiff the opportunity to vindicate his reputation or dignity.
Moreover, the defendant whose stories are adjudged false has the
incentive to check the accuracy of his stories in the future if he val-
ues his own credibility. At the same time, since the focus of the de-
claratory judgment is determining truth or falsity instead of fault,
defendants would benefit from lower litigation costs, the absence of
intrusive discovery, and a less pressing need to appeal. Consequently,
the declaratory judgment would give publishers greater freedom to
decide what to print.
A declaratory judgment will significantly reduce the present
chilling effect on publishers if the plaintiff has the burden of proving
that the defendant's statements were false and that they caused ma-
terial harm to his reputation. Requiring plaintiffs to prove falsity is
appropriate since the plaintiff is both the party initiating the suit and
the party who knows the most about the underlying events. In addi-
tion, if publishers had to prove the accuracy of their stories in order
to avoid a judicial finding of falsity, they would probably limit or
withhold their views. A plaintiff's demonstration that his reputation
has been substantially harmed not only makes his claim legitimate
but also insures that the declaratory judgment will not be used in
244. THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 78, at 15 (statement of Harriette Dorsen, a New
York lawyer who represents publishers).
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bad faith to harass the defendant. Limiting the evidence which will
satisfy proof of harm to observable damage to reputation further
guarantees that publishers will not incur great expense defending
frivolous suits. Discovery should be prohibited in a declaratory judg-
ment action because the chilling effect of its cost greatly outweighs
the likelihood that the defendant has evidence demonstrating the ac-
tual falsity of its own report that the plaintiff could not otherwise
acquire.
Making a declaratory judgment remedy available to all plain-
tiffs recognizes that both public and private individuals have a strong
interest in vindicating their reputation and simplifies the courts' task
of adjudicating libel disputes. Treating public and private plaintiffs
equally would also inspire more plaintiffs to select a declaratory
judgment and thus reduce the number of damage suits. A univer-
sally applicable federal procedure would simplify litigation, deter fo-
rum-shopping, reduce litigants' costs, accelerate adjudication, and
prevent obstructive state measures. To guard against an increase in
the amount of libel litigation, the declaratory judgment action must
be the plaintiff's exclusive remedy once it is chosen. Allowing plain-
tiffs to select either a declaratory action or a damage suit insures
that those who have suffered economic harm can regain their losses
and serves to deter defendants who intentionally or wantonly issue
defamatory statements.
Legislation could modify recovery in damage suits so that plain-
tiffs, who have not experienced pecuniary harm, will be encouraged
to seek a declaratory judgment. One alternative involves limiting the
amount of damages a plaintiff may collect to "economic harm." The
possibility of collecting substantial awards, however, is so strong that
damage suits are likely to remain attractive. A more desirable
change in libel law would be to require all plaintiffs who reject a
declaratory action to prove that the defendant acted with actual mal-
ice. This alternative would provide publishers with greater freedom
of decision while still allowing damages for plaintiffs who have lost
money or who have been intentionally defamed.
A standard under which publishers are liable for negligent
falsehood makes recovery of damages too easy and fails to acknowl-
edge that false statements do contribute significantly to public de-
bate. In sum, the creation of a declaratory judgment procedure, to-
gether with an actual malice standard for plaintiffs who seek
damages, would rationalize and clarify the field of libel law. Both
plaintiffs and their lawyers should view a declaratory judgment as an
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attractive choice if the prevailing party is awarded attorneys' fees.
Most importantly, the establishment of a declaratory judgment ac-
tion would contribute to a fair and intelligent accommodation of the
competing values of protecting reputation and preserving freedom of
expression.

